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Criminal Law-Extradition-Scope of Inquiry by State from Which Extradition

Sought-[New York].--The relator, a resident of New York, was convicted of burglary
in Pennsylvania, where he was sentenced to serve consecutively two six-year terms.
Having served one term, he was paroled with permission to return to New York. Later
he was accused of having violated his parole, and the governor of Pennsylvania issued
a requisition for his extradition so that a hearing on the charges might be held by the
Pennsylvania parole board. The relator was arrested by order of the governor of New
York. Upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus,' held, the relator should be discharged,
as the accusations of parole violation were admittedly false, and it was doubtful
whether the relator would receive just treatment from the Pennsylvania parole board.
2
People ex rel. Pahi v. Pollack.
In habeas corpus proceedings to determine whether a relator should be held for extradition to answer a criminal charge, he is permitted to show only that he is not a fugitive from justice, or that he is not charged with a crime, or that he is not the person
whose extradition is requested.3 Where extradition of a parolee is demanded, the scope
of inquiry by the court of the asylum state should be limited to considerations of
whether relator is the parolee whose extradition is requested. Whenever a parolee who
has left the demanding state is wanted there, he is considered a fugitive from justice;4
and although he has been released from prison, he is charged with the crime until his
sentence has expired.s Thus, in the instant case, while claiming to be acting to prevent
a miscarriage of justice, the court indulged in considerations beyond the scope of its
authority 6 when it considered whether relator had violated the terms of his parole,? or
whether the charges against him were true,8 or whether the Pennsylvania parole board
would act justly.9
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(S.Ct. 1940).

3 People
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14 N.Y.S. (2d) 881 (S. Ct. 1939); People ex rel. Whitfield v. Enright, 117 Misc. 448, 191 N.Y.
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4 Beavers v. Lowry, 186 Ga. 557, I98 S.E. 692 (1938); State ex rel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister,
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accorded more consideration than a person whose extradition is requested upon charges of a
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N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. (McKinney, x938) § 849; Spear, Extradition 361 (3 d ed. 1885). But cf.
Ex parte Maddox, 55 Okla. Crim. 114, 25 P. (2d) xIii (1933); Ex parte Owens, 34 Okla. Crim.
128, 245 Pac. 68 (1926); Matter of Bruchman, 28 N.D. 358, 148 N.W. 1052 (1914); People ex
rel. Wegener v. Magerstadt, 34 Chicago L. News 194 (Cook County Cir. Ct. 1902). In these
cases the court of the asylum state inquired into questions of guilt and innocence and motive
where extradition requested was based on affidavits and it appeared that the only purpose of
the extradition was to subject the relator to civil process in the demanding state.
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RECENT CASES
The parole system was devised as a practical method of reinducting a convict into
society under conditions which will protect the community.- To make this system
effective, administrative machinery has been set up" with better facilities than most
courts of general jurisdiction to determine whether a parolee's conduct is such as to
warrant his reimprisonment. In both New York" and Pennsylvania'3 it is not necessary that the parolee have committed a crime before his case can be considered by the
parole board, but only that he be accused of showing a tendency toward antisocial conduct. In the principal case had the relator not been permitted to leave Pennsylvania,
he would have been subject to detention for hearings before the parole board whenever
they were deemed necessary X4 and no court could have interfered.s The relator obtained through the instant proceedings a court determination not only as to whether
the Pennsylvania parole board should be permitted to consider his case, but also as to
whether he had violated the terms of his parole. Yet in both Pennsylvania and New
York no appeal can be taken from a finding of the parole board,' 6 and thus in no case
can a court consider the merits of an alleged parole violation. It is difficult to see how
the relator acquired such rights merely by being permitted to leave the state.
Decisions like that in the principal case tend to impede efficient parole administration and thus to destroy the legislative safeguards set up to protect society from the release of unsupervised criminals. 7 To avoid this danger, conscientious parole boards
may refuse to permit parolees to leave their state, if, in the discharge of their parole
duties, opposition might be encountered from the courts of other states. Consequently
this view may result in the denial of parole to many eligibles who are capable of finding
employment only outside the state.

Divorce-Estoppel-Second Spouse Not Estopped from Pleading Invalidity of
Wife's Former Divorce in Suit for Separate Maintenance-[New York].-In 1913 the
plaintiff-wife secured a divorce in Pennsylvania, falsely alleging her domicil there. Her
husband, a resident of New York, was not personally served with notice. In I918, the
plaintiff married the defendant, and since that time they have lived in New York.
The plaintiff brought an action for separate maintenance,' and the defendant answered by alleging the invalidity of their marriage inasmuch as her prior divbrce is
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